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DEVELOPMENTS IN CIVIL LIBERTIES: 1984-85 TERM
IVAN E. BODENSTEINER* & ROSALIE B. LEVINSON**
I. LITIGATION INVOLVING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Seventh Circuit tackled various first amendment issues this past
term, dealing with freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of
press as well as the free exercise rights of men in the military. In general,
the Seventh Circuit's position in these cases reflects recent Supreme
Court decisions which will also be highlighted.
A. Freedom of Speech and Association: The Right Not to Associate
The Supreme Court has clearly established that the first amendment
protects both the right to associate as well as a freedom not to associate. I
Similarly, the Court has held that citizens have a right not to contribute
to a government-endorsed political message. For example, in Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Education it was held that public school teachers could not
be forced to join a labor union as a condition of employment. 2 Applying
this doctrine, the plaintiffs in Libertarian Party of Indiana v. Packard,3
challenged Indiana's statutory scheme of raising revenues through the
sale of personalized license plates and distributing a portion of that reve-
nue to qualifying political parties. The Seventh Circuit rejected this
claim by relying on American Party of Texas v. White4 and Buckley v.
Valeo,5 which both hold that government may use public funds to finance
political parties. Although the Indiana scheme allowed the distribution
of funds only to qualifying parties, and the formula meant that only the
two major political parties would receive any revenue, 6 the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted that the two Supreme Court cases similarly upheld distribu-
* Dean and Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; J.D., Notre Dame Law
School.
** Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; J.D., Valparaiso University School
of Law.
1. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3252 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Education et al., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
2. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. at 234 (1977). See also Rutgers v. Galda, 772
F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985) (invalidated state university's exaction of a refundable fee to support stu-
dent-run "public interest research group" that advances positions on political and ideological issues,
contrary to the beliefs of some students).
3. 741 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1984).
4. 415 U.S. 767, reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
6. 741 F.2d at 983.
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tion schemes which favored parties in power based on the important
government interest served by limiting public assistance to those candi-
dates with significant public support. 7
The Supreme Court in Buckley stressed that use of funds to finance
political parties is justifiable because the government's interest is unre-
lated to the advancement of any specific political message, but rather is
advancing the important public interest in encouraging public discussion
and participation in the electoral process. 8 This is in contrast to the fees
at issue in Abood which were being used to support the particular parti-
san viewpoint of one private organization-namely a labor union.9 Since
public financing of qualifying political parties does not offend the first
amendment, the state may constitutionally utilize part of the sales tax on
personalized license plates for this purpose.10
Based on this analysis, the court specifically rejected plaintiff's argu-
ment that Indiana motorists were being forced to forego owning a per-
sonalized license plate in order to avoid contributing money to political
parties with whom they may not agree in violation of the well-established
constitutional principle that government cannot condition benefits on re-
linquishing first amendment rights."' Since the Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly upheld the use of public tax dollars to finance qualifying political
parties, and since the money is not being used to support a particular
viewpoint, such as in Abood, the court reasoned that Indiana's Personal-
ized License Plate Act did not, as a matter of law, condition the availabil-
ity of the government benefit on the surrender of first amendment
rights.1 2 The Supreme Court has held that government may in general
use tax dollars to help support the major political parties in this country;
thus plaintiffs have no first amendment claim that the use of certain tax
dollars derived from the sale of personalized license plates cannot consti-
tutionally be used in this manner. Even in Abood the Court held that
government could constitutionally condition public employment on re-
7. Id. at 987.
8. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 92-93.
9. In Abood the Court held that a local school board and the union representing the school's
teachers could not require a teacher to pay to the union fees that would be used to finance the
advancement of ideological and political causes, at least to the extent the causes were unrelated to
the union's duties as collective bargaining representative. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 (1977).
10. Libertarian Party ofInd., 741 F.2d at 990. Note that plaintiff Libertarian Party also raised
an equal protection challenge. The case, however, went up on a preliminary injunction and the court
ruled that the Libertarian Party must be given an opportunity on remand to make a factual showing
that it was being discriminated against in that the system operated to disadvantage non-major parties
by reducing their strength. Id. at 991-92.
1I. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 357-60 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597
(1972).
12. Libertarian Party of Ind., 741 F.2d at 990.
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quiring employees to pay a fee to be used for collective bargaining be-
cause of the "overriding interests" being served in the prevention of labor
strife.13 Buckley holds that utilization of public funds to finance political
parties similarly advances goals "vital to a self-governing people,"-the
facilitation of public discussion and participation in the electoral pro-
cess. 14 Thus the overriding standard set forth in Abood is arguably met
by the state.
The meaning of the Abood decision also came into play in the case of
Hudson v. Chicago Teacher's Union Local No. 1,15 which is presently
pending before the United States Supreme Court. As stated earlier, in
Abood the Supreme Court established that employees cannot be forced to
join a union or to contribute fees to the union, other than fees used to
support the collective bargaining function of the union. 16 Plaintiffs in
Hudson are challenging the procedure established to determine the pro-
portionate share that nonunion employees should be required to contrib-
ute to support of the union as the collective bargaining agent. Plaintiffs
argue that the procedures lack reasonable protections and thus make it
likely that money collected may be used to support objectives not
germain to the union's function in the collective bargaining process.17
The Seventh Circuit held that the procedure violated both the first
amendment rights described in Abood, and also constituted a violation of
liberty within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.1 8 Whereas the
first amendment requires a procedure to assure that wages not be used to
support the union's political and ideological activities not germain to col-
lective bargaining, the due process clause mandates more broadly that
wages not be used to support any union activities, whether or not the
activities are political or ideological. Since the process established in the
collective bargaining agreement gave the union the right to pay the arbi-
trator and did not provide for judicial review of the decision of the arbi-
trator, the court reasoned that minimum constitutional requirements of
fair notice, a prompt administrative hearing, and judicial review of the
agency's decision were not provided and thus the procedure was uncon-
stitutional. In addition, the court held that a proper escrow arrangement
must be created in order to make sure that the union does not obtain
13. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235.
14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 92-93.
15. 743 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986).
16. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
17. Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1194-95. Under the procedure, the union sets the "service" fee and
although nonunion members may challenge the amount, the decision rests with an arbitrator chosen
by the union.
18. Id. at 1193.
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even temporarily the use of employee dollars for impermissible purposes.
The latter conclusion rests on the Supreme Court holding in Ellis v.
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks,1 9 that a rebate procedure is inadequate
even if the union pays interest on the amount deducted, because the
union in a sense is obtaining an involuntary loan contrary to the Railway
Labor Act. The same analysis, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, applies to a
due process challenge under the fourteenth amendment.
Although the court's ruling in Hudson appears to flow from previ-
ous Supreme Court precedent, the one innovative portion of the decision
deals with the conclusion that an employee cannot be compelled to con-
tribute to any union activities not germain to collective bargaining, re-
gardless of whether the activities are political or ideological. Unlike the
Abood decision which is based only on first amendment doctrine, the Sev-
enth Circuit goes one step further and finds on the basis of a liberty inter-
est "not to associate" a further requirement that fees not go to support
any activities of the union not germain to collective bargaining. The
court reasoned that freedom of association is violated where an individ-
ual is forced to support even the non-ideological activities of the union.
Thus, procedures which reasonably assure that the deprivation will go no
further than is necessary to prevent the individual from taking a free ride
on an entity providing services as a collective bargaining representative
are constitutionally mandated. 20
B. Freedom of the Press
The Supreme Court has frequently rejected the concept of a special
press privilege, holding that members of the press may be required to
testify before grand juries, may be subject to search warrants, and have
no greater right of access to government-held information than the pub-
lic. 2 1 On the other hand, the Court has held that once the press gets the
information, even if that information has been obtained through the ille-
gal activity of third parties, government cannot prohibit or punish the
publication of such information absent a compelling interest and no less
19. 104 S. Ct. 1883, 1890 (1984), discussed in Hudson at 1196.
20. Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1193. The Supreme Court's affirmance was based solely on first
amendment doctrine.
21. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that reporters are not privileged from
appearing before a grand jury or refusing to answer relevant questions); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 885 (1978) (holding that newspaper offices can be subject to
valid search warrants); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (the media has no right of
special access to government information different from or greater than that accorded the public
generally).
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drastic means. 22
In Worrell Newspapers of Indiana, Inc. v. Westhafer 23 the press
challenged an Indiana statute which punishes by contempt anyone who
discloses the name contained in a sealed information prior to the arrest of
the suspect. Although recognizing that the state clearly has an interest in
apprehension of criminals, the flaw found in the Indiana statute was that
it reached beyond the punishment of individuals who by virtue of their
positions in the judiciary are privy to the information contained in a
sealed document. Rule 6(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure sets forth a similar contempt provisions which, however, is limited
to punishing those who hold positions in the criminal justice system.
Thus, although conceding the importance of the state's interest, the
means were held to be overbroad. The state failed to provide any evi-
dence that sanctioning the press was necessary to further its goal of ap-
prehending criminals, and the court ruled that the danger was
insufficient to warrant the infringement on the first amendment. 24 This
conclusion was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court last term.25
C. Access to Government-Owned Property
The Supreme Court in recent years has focused on the place wherein
first amendment rights are being exercised in deciding the extent to
which government regulation of speech will be tolerated. Speech in
traditional and limited public forums, i.e., government-owned property
which traditionally has been open for use by the public as a place for
expressive activity, is highly protected and any regulation must be con-
tent neutral and narrowly tailored to accomplish significant government
interests. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that speech on
public property which is not by tradition a forum for public communica-
tion may be regulated provided the regulation meets the lesser standard
of reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.26 The trend in recent years
has been for the Supreme Court to identify most government-owned
property as a "nonpublic" forum, and therefore to allow greater regula-
22. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (invalidating on first
amendment grounds a state law which punished individuals for divulging or publishing truthful
information regarding confidential proceedings of a State Judicial Review Commission prior to filing
formal complaints about a judge's misconduct).
23. 739 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985).
24. Id. at 1225.
25. Westhafer v. Worrell Newspapers, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985) (summary affirmance without
opinion).
26. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See Boden-
steiner and Levinson, Current Developments in Civil Liberties, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229-232
(1985), discussing this development.
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tion of speech in such locations. Last term, for example, the Supreme
Court upheld denial of access to a federal fundraising campaign.
Although the government had allowed various groups to reach govern-
ment employees through a unified official campaign, it had not thereby
created a federal forum, and therefore the government could selectively
grant and deny access to that forum provided that its regulation was
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.27 In another case the Court held that
a military base, previously recognized as a nonpublic forum, does not
become a public forum simply because the base holds an open house.
28
Two Seventh Circuit decisions this term reflect these principles. In
a case almost identical to the Supreme Court decision involving the army
base, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Quilty29 rejected the first
amendment claims of a defendant arrested on the premises of the Rock
Island Arsenal while participating in a peaceful prayer meeting. The
court held that even where the military base is open to certain groups,
this does not transform a military base into a public forum. The defend-
ants had previously received a "bar letter," prohibiting them from ever
entering the base, based on their earlier participation in an antinuclear
demonstration on the Arsenal premises. Under federal law they could be
fined and imprisoned for reentering the base.30 Relying on the nonpublic
nature of the forum, the court held that the convictions could be
sustained.
The nonpublic forum analysis also figured significantly in the
Court's review of the claims presented in Piarowski v. Illinois Community
College.31 In this case the chairman of the art department alleged that
his first amendment rights were violated when the college demanded that
he relocate certain of his art works to an alternative site on campus due
to the sexual explicitness and potential racial offensiveness of the mate-
rial. Although recognizing that purely artistic expression is protected by
the first amendment, the court reasoned that the gallery was not a public
forum.3 2 Even though artists from outside the college had in the past
been invited to exhibit their work in the gallery, that was not enough to
transform a college art gallery into a public forum.3 3 Further, plaintiff's
position as a public employee was stressed, because Supreme Court pre-
27. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985).
28. U.S. v. Albertini, 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985).
29. 741 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1984).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1982). Note that this very same provision was being contested in the
Supreme Court case last term in U.S. v. Albertini, supra note 28.
31. 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 528 (1985).
32. Id. at 629.
33. See discussion supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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cedent dictates that government may place greater restrictions on its em-
ployees than it may on the public in general.
3 4
Although much of its analysis is persuasive, the court then proceeds
to espouse the troublesome theory that sexually explicit though non-por-
nographic art can be subjected to greater regulation than political
speech.3 5 Although a plurality opinion in an earlier Supreme Court deci-
sion had espoused this view, the majority of the Court has refused to give
this type of material a less protected constitutional status. 36 The Piarow-
ski opinion emphasizes further that this is a case of relocating, not sup-
pressing sexually explicit material in that the plaintiff was offered an
alternative, though less conspicuous site for his display. The Supreme
Court, however, has specifically held that the availability of alternative
sites does not mitigate a first amendment violation.3 7 Although the uni-
versity argued that the display in a place of great prominence and visibil-
ity might imply college approval of the art, certainly this concern could
have been met by the posting of some type of disclaimer. The court also
expressed concern with federalizing "every trivial alteration of the site of
an art exhibit."' 38 Although some of these comments in isolation are
troublesome, the Seventh Circuit does conclude by stressing the compila-
tion of factors, i.e. the nature of the expression, the fact that the plaintiff
was a faculty member and administrator, that the college sought reloca-
tion not removal, and that the material sought to be exhibited was both
sexually explicit and racially offensive art work. Together perhaps they
34. 759 F.2d at 629. Another Seventh Circuit decision dealing with the free speech rights of
government employees is Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
36 (1985). Applying the analysis set forth in the Supreme Court decision of Connick v. Meyers
(discussed in Bodensteiner and Levinson, Current Developments in Civil Liberties, 60 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. at 456-60 (1984), the court held that the teacher had viable claims for impermissible retalia-
tion, in that her speech both (1) involved some matters of public concern and (2) was a motivating
factor in the defendant's conduct. Perhaps most significant about the decision is the court's analysis
of what types of speech meet the "matters of public concern" standard, which due to Connick has
become a critical inquiry in retaliation suits. See, e.g., McCabe, Free Speech of Government Employ-
ees, 60 IND. L.J. 339 (1985). The court held here that although complaints about classroom assign-
ment and evaluation content were not matters of public concern, speech regarding inequitable
mileage allowance for coaches, the extent of liability insurance and grievance procedures did qualify.
35. Id. at 630.
36. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976). In
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986), the Court upheld a zoning law aimed at
adult theatres by finding that the city's primary concerns were the effects of such theatres on the
surrounding community and not the content of the films. The reasoning in the case would support
the holding in Piarowski.
37. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2133 (1984); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
74, 76-77 (1981); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
38. Piarowski, 759 F.2d at 632.
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justify the conclusion that no first amendment rights were violated in this
case.
D. Free Exercise Rights of Men in the Military
In Ogden v. United States39 the Seventh Circuit dealt with the ques-
tion of whether the commander of the Great Lakes Naval Training
Center would constitutionally place "off limits" facilities operated by cer-
tain churches. After concluding based upon Supreme Court precedent
that the plaintiffs were precluded from seeking monetary but not injunc-
tive relief,4° the court proceeded to discuss a recent decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In
Goldman v. Weinberger4 1 the appellate court upheld strict enforcement
of Air Force uniform dress requirements, refusing to allow a "religious
garb" exemption to an Orthodox Jewish officer required by his faith to
wear a yarmulke (skullcap). The court in that case stressed the less pro-
tected status of free exercise rights of men in the military and upheld the
regulation as necessary to avoid serious disruption to the military's inter-
est in uniformity.
42
Here the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the off-limits order was
based upon evidence that a religious group was encouraging unauthor-
ized absences and that there had been some incidents of sexual assault
and intimidation by members of the religious group. 43 The relevant in-
quiry, as stated by the Goldman court, is whether these legitimate mili-
tary ends are "being achieved by means designed to accommodate the
individual right to an appropriate degree." 44 In examining the question
of appropriate accommodation, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that both
the degree of interference or intrusiveness of the military action and the
nature of the religious activity had to be scrutinized. Thus, an order
which completely barred participation in religious service would merit
closer scrutiny than an order which merely restricted the time or location
of participating in a less intensely religious practice.45 Since, however,
the district court failed to determine the precise religious practices that
39. 758 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1985).
40. As to the procedural question, the court held that although the Supreme Court decision in
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), foreclosed a Bivens-type remedy for damages, the Supreme
Court had left open the availability of an equitable remedy. 758 F.2d at 1174-78.
41. 734 F.2d 1531, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986), discussed in Ogden,
758 F.2d at 1179-80.
42. 734 F.2d at 1539, 1541.
43. Ogden, 758 F.2d at 1171-73.
44. Id. at 1183 (citing Goldman, 734 F.2d at 1536).
45. Id.
432
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took place in at least one of the "off-limit" sites, and failed to elucidate
the degree of intrusiveness of the off-limits declaration, the case was re-
manded for further proceedings.46
While stating its reliance on the standard enunciated in Goldman,
the Seventh Circuit's analysis exhibits a greater sensitivity to religious
freedom than did the D.C. Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit opin-
ion specifically cautions that if indeed religious worship was displaced by
the off-site declaration, and no readily available alternative site existed,
the defendants would carry a greater burden of showing why an excep-
tion to the off-limits order should not exist.4 7 In defining this burden, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the defendant would have to prove that at-
tendence at organized worship services "would necessarily entail the type
of individual encounters or specific harms that the military legitimately
desires to avoid."'48 This is in contrast to the much more deferential ap-
proach taken by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the
Goldman case, wherein the military's general assertion of a need for uni-
formity in dress code was held to outweigh the free exercise rights of an
individual who merely wanted to wear a skullcap in observance of his
faith.
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding in Goldman.49 Without
articulating a specific standard, it stressed that great deference must be
given to the professional judgment of military authorities and that the
first amendment "does not require the military to accommodate such
practices in face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity
sought by the dress regulations."50
II. DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT ACTION
The Seventh Circuit decided several interesting cases involving the
due process clause of the constitution. In general the cases reflect well-
46. Id. at 1184-85.
47. This attempt to accommodate the competing concerns is reminiscent of the approach taken
by the Seventh Circuit in Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983) in which the court, while sustaining an Illinois rule prohibiting high
school basketball players from wearing yarmulkes during interscholastic games, interpreted the rule
as only prohibiting insecurely fastened head coverings. Id. at 1034. The parties were advised that
the court would enjoin enforcement of the rule if the state failed to approve an adequate solution,
and, on remand, the District Court approved the wearing of special clips to prevent the yarmulkes
from falling off. See Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n No. 8 1C960 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1983). See
discussion of this case in Bodensteiner & Levinson, Current Developments in Civil Liberties, 60 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 455, 464-65 (1984). This survey also discusses Seventh Circuit cases finding less
protection for free exercise rights in the prison context. Id. at 465-68.
48. Ogden, 758 F.2d at 1184.
49. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
50. Id. at 1314.
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established Supreme Court doctrine, but a few raise highly controversial
questions regarding the Parratt limitation on due process claims as well
as the broader meaning of substantive due process as a guarantee against
arbitrary government decision-making.
A. Protecting Property and Liberty Interests Under
the Due Process Clause
The Seventh Circuit analyzed procedural due process challenges to
government action under the now well-established standard set forth in
the Supreme Court decision of Mathews v. Eldridge.51 The first part of
the Mathews analysis requires identification of a property or liberty inter-
est necessary to trigger procedural safeguards. 52 An interesting challenge
to the existence of a property right was made in the case of Sowers v. City
of Fort Wayne, Ind..53 Plaintiffs had been promoted in rank by the fire
chief, but were then demoted when the city, in compliance with a state
court order, reinstated the previous employees. 54 Defendants argued
that plaintiffs had no legitimate claim of entitlement since their promo-
tions were invalid in the first instance. The court summarily rejected this
argument, looking to state law which clearly established property inter-
ests on behalf of the plaintiffs that could be taken only in accordance
with due process of law.55 In short, in complying with the court order in
a previous case, the defendants had infringed on the plaintiff's due pro-
cess rights.
In addition to property interests, the Supreme Court has also recog-
nized that deprivations of "liberty" may trigger procedural safeguards.
Last year in Lawson v. Sheriff of Tippecanoe County, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit reasoned, based upon Supreme Court precedent, that the term
liberty includes the right to follow a trade, profession or calling. 56 Thus
51. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
52. Id. at 333-35.
53. 737 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 623.
55. Id. at 624. Indiana law clearly sets forth the conditions under which and the terms for
which demotion would be possible, specifically requiring predeprivation written notice ten day prior
to a hearing date. On the question of the existence of a property interest rooted in state law, see also
Malcak v. Westchester Park Dist., 754 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1985) (reversing a jury verdict, based on
the court's finding that as a matter of state law plaintiff did not establish a protected property inter-
est-the key holding was that a court may as a matter of law decide the existence of the property
interest if the state law from which the interest derives would allow the determination to be made as
a matter of law); Schultz v. Baumgart, 738 F.2d 231, 234-35 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that under
Wisconsin law, including statutes and cases, the plaintiff had a legitimate claim of entitlement "to be
dismissed only on charges that could be sustained by the evidence").
56. 725 F.2d 1136, 1138 (7th Cir. 1984), discussed in last year's Survey, 61 CHI-KENT L. REV.
at 236 (1985).
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even if a cognizable property interest does not exist, if an individual loses
his job and simultaneously is publicly defamed, such that the statement
would preclude future employment, due process attaches. This concept
stems from Paul v. Davis, wherein the Supreme Court held, however, that
defamation alone is not a cognizable liberty interest. 57 Strictly adhering
to this case precedent, the Seventh Circuit last term reversed a trial court
ruling which appeared on the record to have rested upon a defamation
action alone. In Bone v. City of Lafayette, Ind. ,58 plaintiff alleged that the
city revoked her building permit and that the city engineer subsequently
told a bank that she had lied on her original application for the permit.
The district court judge focused solely on the defamatory allegations,
making no findings as to any other types of injury. Since the trial court
erroneously believed that defamation alone could support a § 1983 ac-
tion, the case was remanded. 59
Finally in Bigby v. City of Chicago6° the court held that although
there is a liberty interest to engage in a certain occupation, this does not
include a liberty interest regarding ranks within that occupation: ".
while preventing someone from advancing in his occupation can be a
cruel deprivation, it would stretch the idea of liberty of occupation aw-
fully far .. . to treat a bar to promotion as a deprivation of that lib-
erty."'61 Because it refused to find a constitutionally protected liberty or
property interest in promotion to rank of lieutenant, the court dismissed
the police sergeants' due process claim that their denial of promotion was
based on failure of an examination which was unrelated to a lieutenant's
duties. 6
2
B. The Meaning of Substantive Due Process
In addition to raising procedural due process claims, the plaintiffs in
Bigby also alleged that the use of a test which is not reasonably related to
57. 424 U.S. 693, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
58. 763 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1985).
59. Id. at 299. Note that in its analysis the court suggests that even where there is defamation
plus a contemporaneous firing, such as in Lawson, this does not implicate a "liberty" entitlement
unless it can be shown that the government conduct truly affected plaintiff's employability. Id. at
298. See also Greene v. Finley, 749 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1984) suggesting in dictum that a termination
based on a criminal conviction does not trigger a liberty entitlement because the stigma to reputation
is not caused by the employer's conduct. 749 F.2d at 469 n. 1. The court assumed the existence of a
liberty or property interest, but held that plantiff received all the process he was "due" through the
course of the criminal proceeding. Id. at 469-70.
60. 766 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Thoele v. City of Chicago, 106 S. Ct.
793 (1986).
61. Id. at 1057.
62. Id.
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the needs of the position, violates substantive due process. 63 The Seventh
Circuit cautioned that such a claim is viable only when government mis-
conduct is "deeply repulsive to the feelings of Supreme Court Justices."
64
A civil service exam, even if it is "a stupidly designed test hopelessly
maladapted to the purpose for which it is being given," does not shock
the conscience, and thus fails to violate substantive due process.
In another case this term, Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc. ,65
the court similarly held that in order for government misconduct to vio-
late substantive due process it must "shock the conscience" of the court.
In Rodgers, the plaintiff had been jailed for over ten hours before being
allowed to post bail, following his arrest on alleged vandalism charges.
In both decisions then the Seventh Circuit narrowly construed substan-
tive due process to apply only where the misconduct is sufficiently outra-
geous so as to meet the "shocking to the conscience" standard derived
from the Supreme Court decision of Rochin v. California.66 On the other
hand, the Seventh Circuit in Coleman v. Frantz held that an eighteen-day
detention without an appearance before a judge or magistrate is "wholly
inconsistent with notions of 'fundamental fairness' " and that it meets the
Rochin test.
67
The meaning of substantive due process-when it is triggered and
what standard must be met before it is violated-has created much con-
fusion in the lower courts and has been the subject of recent commen-
tary.68 The Supreme Court last term dealt with this question in an
unfortunately very weak factual context regarding a student dismissed
from a combined medical/undergraduate degree program. In Regents of
University of Michigan v. Ewing 69 the plaintiff argued that his dismissal
from the program after having completed four years of study was arbi-
trary and capricious, violating his substantive due process rights.
Although Ewing was dismissed from the University of Michigan pro-
63. Id. at 1058.
64. Id.
65. 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
66. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). Other courts have similarly required that government miscon-
duct be "severe," "reprehensible," or "egregious" in order to violate substantive due process. See,
e.g., Davis v. Forrest, 768 F.2d 257, 258 (8th Cir. 1985); Raley v. Fraser, 747 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir.
1984); Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 n.I (6th Cir. 1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents,
660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 460 U.S. 719 (1983); Shillingford v.
Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1981).
67. 754 F.2d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 1985). The court proceeded to hold, however, that the defend-
ant was entitled to qualified immunity from liability because he was simply following procedures set
forth by the circuit court and did not violate clearly established law. Id. at 731.
68. See, e.g., Wells and Eaton, Substantive Due Process, and the Scope of Constitutional Torts,
18 GA. L. REV. 201 (1984).
69. 106 S. Ct. 507 (1985).
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gram based upon his failure of a two-day written exam administered by
the National Board of Medical Examiners, he argued that students had
routinely been given a second opportunity to take the test.
70
Ewing was not challenging the procedural fairness of the decision-
making process, because he was given an opportunity to appear both
before the National Board as well as before the Executive Committee of
the medical school to present his case. Rather Ewing's sole claim was
that the dismissal was an arbitrary, capricious decision. The Court as-
sumed that the plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest
in continued enrollment, and that substantive due process assures that
such enrollment be free from arbitrary state action. The Court then de-
termined, based on the record, that the faculty's decision to expel Ewing
from the program was made "conscientiously and with careful delibera-
tion."'71 Stressing the need to defer to academic judgment, the Supreme
Court reasoned that substantive due process would be violated only if the
decision was "such a substantial departure from accepted academic
norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did
not actually exercise professional judgment.
'72
Although the Court in Ewing stressed the importance of restrained
judicial review in the realm of academic decisions, what is critical is that
the suggested standard was not as high as the "shocking to the con-
science" approach utilized by the Seventh Circuit. As noted earlier, the
fact situation in Ewing was extremely weak in that Ewing had a long
record of academic deficiencies, justifying the Court's conclusion that the
dismissal was not "beyond the pale of reasoned academic decision-mak-
ing when viewed against the background of [Ewing's] entire career at the
University of Michigan. '73 Despite this conclusion, the Court acknowl-
edges that substantive due process does protect against arbitrary, capri-
cious government decisionmaking, even where procedural norms are
satisfied. Although the Court's approach was highly deferential, this was
due to the need for academic freedom, which is not implicated in the
types of decision-making that the Seventh Circuit faced this term. Recall
that in Bigby the Seventh Circuit reasoned that even if the test utilized
for promotions in the police department was a "stupidly designed test
hopelessly maladapted to the purposes for which it is being given," it
70. Id. at 509.
71. Id. at 513.
72. Id. Note that this language is taken from Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), hold-
ing that a substantive due process violation regarding a mentally handicapped individual held invol-
untarily in a state hospital would not be found unless the decisions of hospital staff departed from
professional judgment. 457 U.S. at 323.
73. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 106 S. Ct. at 515.
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would not violate substantive due process because it did not "shock the
conscience."' 74  The Seventh Circuit overruled an earlier holding that
professional qualifying tests and standards must bear a rational relation-
ship to the skills necessary for the job in order to withstand a due process
challenge. 75 Arguably the Ewing decision supports the latter approach to
substantive due process claims.
On the other hand, the court in Bigby did stress that it was dealing
with a test used for promotion, rather than a test which would exclude an
individual from an entire occupation, which would raise a stronger lib-
erty claim and thus perhaps justify imposition of a heavier burden on the
state.76 Support for this approach is found in Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Ewing, in which he argues that before the protections of sub-
stantive due process should attach, the asserted interest violated must be
carefully examined to determine whether it even merits due process pro-
tection. 77 Justice Powell stated that continued enrollment in a medical
degree program is not the type of fundamental interest, such as privacy,
which triggers substantive due process in the first place.78 The problem
74. Bigby, 766 F.2d at 1058.
75. Id. at 1053. The court overrules Dilulio v. Bd. of Fire & Police Com'rs of Northlake, 682
F.2d 666 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982). the Dilulio approach was also followed in
Schanuel v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1983) and Thompson v. Schmidt, 601 F.2d 305 (7th
Cir. 1979). In other contexts the Seventh Circuit has similarly stated that due process is violated by
a legislative act which is arbitrary and unreasonable or by vindictive, malicious application of
facially neutral laws. See, e.g., Albery v. Redding, 718 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1983); Ciechon v. City of
Chicago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d
947, 958 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 446 U.S. 359 (1980).
76. Bigby, 766 F.2d at 1059.
77. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 106 S. Ct. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 516 (citing Harrah Indep. School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979) (holding that a
school board's non-renewal of a teacher contract because of the teacher's failure to earn required
college credits did not deprive her of substantive due process)). While the Court in Harrah did state
that the interest implicated did not resemble the types of privacy interests protected in earlier sub-
stantive due process decisions, the Court proceeded to examine the question of whether any rational
connection existed between the board's action and its conceded interest in providing its students with
competent well trained-teachers.
The only Seventh Circuit decision this term which did involve well-recognized fundamental
privacy rights was Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985),petition for cert. filed, 10-16-85
(54 U.S.L.W. 3399), in which plaintiffs challenged a twenty-four hour wait period requirement im-
posed on unemancipated pregnant minors. The Supreme Court has struck twenty-four hour waiting
periods regarding adult women, and the Seventh Circuit reasoned that any state interest in promot-
ing parental consultation does not outweigh the burden imposed by a waiting period. Since a funda-
mental privacy right is implicated, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the state had to prove the
regulation was "narrowly drawn to further a compelling interest." 763 F.2d at 1537. Although the
Supreme Court has upheld the validity of parental notification requirements, i.e. in H.L. v. Mathe-
son, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), such requirements must provide an exception to notification for mature
minors and immature minors whose best interests require an abortion. The existence of notification
requirements already satisfies the state's interests in promoting parental consultation, thus support-
ing the court's conclusion that the additional burdensome waiting period requirement is unconstitu-
tional. 763 F.2d at 1538.
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with this reasoning is that it confuses the fundamental liberty interest
analysis under substantive due process, where government is required to
satisfy strict scrutiny (compelling interest-no less drastic means analysis),
with the more general claim that whenever liberty or property interests
are implicated, government must exercise its decision-making powers in
a rational fashion. Thus in Bigby even though the officer is not being
totally excluded from an entire occupation, substantive due process
should still require that government decision-making regarding promo-
tions not be totally arbitrary and capricious. Although concededly the
nature of the interest affected is critical in analyzing the rationality of the
government's conduct, characterizing the interest as "non-fundamental"
should not end the inquiry.
A similar unnecessarily narrow approach to substantive due process
is reflected in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing
Service, Inc. The court recognized that a liberty interest is at stake when
the police jail an individual for over ten hours before allowing him to
post bail. It ruled, however, that the delay, even though in violation of
the Illinois Supreme Court rules recommending that the booking proce-
dure take only one hour, was not so long as to "shock the conscience." 79
Although not meeting this strict standard, the overnight detention with-
out being informed of any constitutional rights and being specifically de-
nied the opportunity to post bond and to call a lawyer, could perhaps
support a finding that the government conduct was arbitrary and
capricious.
C. Due Process Imposes No Affirmative Duty on Government to
Provide Protective Services
Another limitation on due process claims was imposed by the case
of Jackson v. City of Joliet.80 There the Seventh Circuit held that the
liberty clause of the fourteenth amendment is not violated when only
government inaction is alleged, because the constitution is a charter of
negative liberties and does not create affirmative obligations.8 1 The Jack-
son analysis was followed in two Seventh Circuit decisions this term
79. Rodgers, 771 F.2d 194, 194 (7th Cir. 1985). Note that the Supreme Court in Baker v. Mc-
Collan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-46 (1979), held that the claimant's detention for three days did not rise to
the level of a fourteenth amendment deprivation without due process, so plaintiff must argue addi-
tional factors to support the allegations of a substantive due process violation. Also note that after
summarily concluding that the delay did not "shock the conscience," the court in Rodgers proceeded
to stress the availability of adequate state tort remedies to redress the wrong. 771 F.2d at 199. This
aspect of the case is discussed infra note 98 and accompanying text.
80. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1983).
81. Id. at 1203. Accord: Bowers v.DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
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which rejected due process claims. Beard v. O'Neal 82 involved suit
against an FBI informant who accompanied a contract murderer on the
night of the killing. Reasoning that the government official had no con-
stitutional duty to prevent the murder, the court held that his failure to
take steps to protect the victim did not cause the deprivation within the
meaning of the due process guarantee.
83
Similarly in Jackson v. Byrne 84 the court rejected claims on the part
of parents whose children were killed during the Chicago firefighter's
strike. In response to the strike, the city had ordered several fire houses
closed and guarded by Chicago policemen in an effort to effectively con-
centrate available manpower.85 When a fire broke out in a home located
across the street from one of the unmanned fire houses, four striking fire
fighters tried to gain access to the guarded fire houses, but the police
barred their way. 86 Thirteen minutes later a fire truck dispatched from
one of the manned fire houses arrived at the scene, but it was too late to
save the lives of the children in question.
Rejecting the due process claims, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
the constitution creates no positive entitlement to fire protection. 87 More
generally, it stated that affirmative duties do not exist unless the state
creates a custodial or other special relationship with the harmed individ-
ual.8 8 The question here, however, was whether the city engaged in more
82. 728 F.2d 894 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 104 (1984).
83. Id. at 899, 902.
84. 738 F.2d 1443 (7th Cir. 1984).
85. Id. at 1445.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1446.
88. Id. at 1447. The court thus distinguished cases such as White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381
(7th Cir. 1979), holding that the constitution creates a duty to protect minor children from immedi-
ate hazards after police officers arrest the children's guardian. Other cases involving this affirmative
duty to act once a special relationship is created are discussed in last year's survey, 61 CHI-KENT L.
REV. at 239 (1985). See also Baldi v. City of Philadelphia, 609 F. Supp. 162, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(once police officers stopped a vehicle containing a sick individual in order to issue a traffic citation
for running a red light, officers were under some obligation to provide emergency escort transporta-
tion or at least not to prevent the individual from obtaining necessary emergency medical care);
Madden v. City of Meriden, 602 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (D. Conn. 1985) (complaint stated a valid
claim against the city for the death of a youth who hung himself while in pretrial custody, the court
reasoning that failure to provide regulations and procedures to assure the safety of detainees with
known histories of self-injury did constitute a deprivation of due process). Compare Ellsworth v.
City of Racine, 592 F. Supp. 1262, 1264-65 (E.D. Wis. 1984), aff'd, 774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985).
(city's failure to provide wife of narcotics dealer with twenty-four hour police protection with the
result that she was beaten unconscious by unknown assailant failed to state a claim since the city's
conduct did not deprive the wife of any liberty interest); Williams v. City of Boston, 599 F. Supp.
363, 366 (D. Mass. 1984) (civil rights remedy is unavailable to a victim shot during an interscholastic
football game since the injury was caused by mere government inaction in the absence of any duty to
act). See also Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) wherein Justice Rehnquist specifically
rejects the notion that the special relationship existing in the prison context creates a duty of care
which protects prisoners against negligent misconduct. Instead the Court held that something more
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than "mere inaction" when Chicago police officers prevented the picket-
ing firefighters from gaining access to the municipal fire house. The
court reasoned that the police did not prevent the firefighters from efforts
to rescue the deceased children, but merely barred them from reaching
city fire equipment. Since the constitution does not require a municipal-
ity to provide potential rescuers with even the most elementary firefight-
ing equipment, due process has not been violated.
89
The court's analysis ignores the substantive due process argument
discussed in the previous section, i.e. that government officials violate due
process when their conduct is arbitrary and capricious, in light of all the
circumstances. 90 Although the constitution does not require the city to
provide fire equipment to rescuers, the deliberate decision of the police to
preclude striking firefighters from utilizing facilities which would save
lives, was sufficiently egregious so as to meet even the "shocks the con-
science" standard.9' The fact that the police officers did not set the fire is
irrelevant, because their conduct in refusing access to fire equipment
right across the street from a burning home arguably contributed to the
peril. Thus the plaintiffs should have been given the opportunity, fore-
closed by grant of summary judgment in this case, to prove the causation
requirement.
D. Parratt Limitations on Due Process Claims
In Parratt v. Taylor the Supreme Court held that the due process
clause is not violated where the state provides an adequate remedy for
the negligent deprivation of property rights.92 The Court reasoned that
the state has not deprived the plaintiff of due process where there is no
practical way for the state to provide a predeprivation hearing (because it
cannot control random, unauthorized misconduct of its employees), and
the state does afford an adequate post-deprivation remedy.93 In Hudson
v. Palmer94 the Supreme Court extended this rationale to include inten-
tional deprivations of property by random, unauthorized government of-
ficial misconduct. The Court reasoned that whenever the provision of
predeprivation process is impractical or impossible, the existence of an
adequate state post-deprivation remedy satisfies due process. In both of
than negligence-possibly recklessness or intent-must be pleaded to make out a cause of action
under the Due Process Clause.
89. 738 F.2d at 1448.
90. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
92. 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981).
93. Id. at 543.
94. 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3203 (1984).
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these cases only a deprivation of property rights was implicated, leaving
unanswered the question of whether this due process analysis also applies
to liberty claims. The circuit courts have divided on this issue.95
The Seventh Circuit this term continued to apply Parratt to depriva-
tions of life and liberty, as well as property. In Guenther v. Holmgreen 
96
the court held that plaintiff's arrest, allegedly made without probable
cause and based upon an officer's factual misrepresentations, does not
constitute a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, because
Wisconsin tort remedies for false arrest, false imprisonment and mali-
cious prosecution sufficiently satisfy the demands of due process.
97 Simi-
larly in Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., the court reasoned that
when random, unauthorized actions by state officials deprive an individ-
ual of liberty-there an alleged impermissible detention-the availability
of adequate state tort remedies to redress the wrong meets the constitu-
tional requirement of due process. 98 In short, the court reasoned that the
plaintiff's access to state tort claims for false imprisonment and mali-
cious prosecution precludes him from using section 1983 to compensate
him for his injuries.
Although the fourteenth amendment does not itself prioritize liberty
and property, some opinions suggest that the distinction may be a viable
one.9 9 The Supreme Court this term had the opportunity to resolve the
95. See, e.g., Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 828 (3rd Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds,
106 S. Ct. 668 (1986) (specifically arguing that it would be untenable to apply Parratt where liberty
or life interests are implicated because this would deprive § 1983 of its original remedial purpose to
preserve human liberty and human rights); Wilson v. Beebe, 743 F.2d 342, 349-51 (6th cir. 1984)
(liberty deprivations which are at the heart of the statute deserve more careful scrutiny than prop-
erty deprivations). Accord Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708, 712 (9th cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 372 n.10 (5th Cir. 1981). Con-
tra Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 334-37 (5th Cir. 1984) (no reason to differentiate between
liberty interests and property interests in the context of procedural due process); Daniels v. Wil-
liams, 720 F.2d 792, 795 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) (Parratt
applies to intentional deprivations of liberty); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345,
1352 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983) (under
Parratt plaintiff must show that post-deprivation tort remedies under Arizona law are deficient in
order to state a valid § 1983 claim for intentional assault and battery); Engbloom v. Carey, 677 F.2d
957, 964-66 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 724 F.2d 28 (2nd Cir. 1983) (Parratt's reference to Ingraham gives
implicit recognition to the extension of Parratt to deprivations of liberty).
96. 738 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1182 (1985).
97. Id. at 882.
98. 771 F.2d at 199.
99. See for example Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Parratt in which he specifically
states that he does not view the case to apply to deprivations of life or liberty. 451 U.S. 527, at 545.
Similarly in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) the Court stressed that "'[where only
property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due pro-
cess, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination ... is adequate.' " Id. at 611 (this
passage is cited in Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540). On the other hand, the Parratt majority states that its
analysis is consistent with the analysis in the earlier Ingraham decision in which the Court denied
due process challenges in the context of school paddlings, which clearly implicated liberty interests.
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conflict. In Daniels v. Williams 100 the Fourth Circuit had ruled that neg-
ligent deprivations of liberty are not actionable under the due process
clause; and that even if there is a liberty interest to be free from negligent
misconduct, a deprivation is not without due process of law where the
state provides post-deprivation remedies. Although the appellate court
could have ended its analysis after finding that negligent injuries to the
person do not violate due process, the court proceeded to make it clear
that Parratt, which reaches both intentional and negligent conduct, ap-
plies even in the context of liberty deprivations. 101 In contrast, the Third
Circuit held in Davidson v. O'Lone'o2 that Parratt should not be applied
to deprivations of liberty. It proceeded to rule, however, that negligent
deprivations of liberty do not violate due process. This analysis would
support a claim for intentional deprivation of liberty, contrary to the
Daniels holding that Parratt governs all claims.
In reviewing these two decisions the Supreme Court avoided the
Parratt question by simply holding that claims of negligence are not ac-
tionable under the due process clause. 103 The Court overruled its deter-
mination in Parratt that neither § 1983 nor the due process clause
imposes any state of mind requirement. Thus even states which fail to
provide a remedy for negligent deprivations of property are immune
from due process claims. The Court's holding that the negligent depriva-
tions of liberty in Daniels and Davidson did not rise to a constitutional
level leaves unanswered the issue posed by the Seventh Circuit cases, i.e.
the availability of a due process remedy for intentional deprivations of
liberty. Although it is true that Parratt rests on the impossibility of pro-
viding predeprivation process where only random, unauthorized miscon-
duct is implicated, and that this rationale arguably extends to
deprivations of liberty, this simplistic analysis appears inappropriate
where government misconduct affects personal liberty.
The Seventh Circuit's willingness to extend Parratt to liberty depri-
vations should be contrasted with the analysis used in Schultz v. Baum-
gart,'°4 involving the discharge of a Wisconsin firefighter. The court
overturned the lower court finding that the public employee waived his
procedural due process rights by failing to take advantage of pretermina-
See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 542. At least one lower court has relied upon the latter reference to uphold
the extension of Parratt to encompass liberty claims. See Engbloom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 964-66
(2d Cir. 1982).
100. 748 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
101. Id. at 232.
102. 752 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
103. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
104. 738 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1984).
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tion opportunities.10 5 What is critical is that the court cautioned that on
remand the district court could not rely on Parratt to negate the due
process claim. Since the city's fire chief, rather than some low-level gov-
ernment official, imposed the sanctions, the court reasoned that the con-
stitutional violation was complete at the time of the firing and could not
be cured by subsequent state remedies.106 Since it would not have been
impractical for the police chief to have provided the plaintiff predepriva-
tion process, Parratt was inapplicable. The Supreme Court in Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co. 1 0 7 held that Parratt does not apply where plaintiff
challenges a state statute which allegedly brings about the deprivation of
property rights. It emphasized the distinction between unauthorized
random official misuse of power for which government may not be held
accountable and action taken pursuant to established state law or policy.
Apparently the Seventh Circuit felt that this case, involving in effect a
"policy" of the police chief, fell within the latter category. 10 8
Finally it should be noted that Parratt controls only procedural due
process claims, and is inapposite where significant deprivations of liberty
are alleged. This was stressed by the Eleventh Circuit in a recent en banc
decision involving police officers' use of excessive force. 10 9 The court
stated that the historical purpose of section 1983 was to eliminate the
physical violence that was being visited on citizens by those entrusted to
keep the peace. In light of this history, the court concluded that substan-
tive due process claims are outside the Parratt rule because the constitu-
tional violation is complete at the moment the harm occurs. 110 Other
105. Id. at 237.
106. Id. at 237-38 n.9. This same limitation on Parratt is reflected in Patterson v. Coughlin, 761
F.2d 886, 892 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 879 (1986), noting that the relevent question is
".. . whether the conduct of the state's agent that resulted in the deprivation was such as to make the
injury unforeseeable when viewed from the position of one who possesses the state-delegated author-
ity to grant a hearing when circumstances and the constitution so required." Id. at 892. See also
infra note 110.
107. 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982).
108. Although the facts in Baumgart involved an unwritten policy, certainly this should fit the
Logan exception to Parratt. The key to Parratt is that the wrongdoing was "random and unauthor-
ized." The Fifth Circuit recognized the same distinction in Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 328-29
(5th Cir. 1984), reversing a district court dismissal of a § 1983 suit where plaintiff was not given the
opportunity to establish that his arrest and detention without probable cause reflected "official pol-
icy," such that the availability of post-deprivation remedies would not bar the procedural due pro-
cess claim. As the court stated, "Parratt v. Taylor is not a magic wand that can make any section
1983 action resembling a tort suit disappear into thin air." 740 F.2d at 329.
109. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (1 1th Cir. 1985), rev'g en banc the earlier ruling
at 737 F.2d 894 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1986). Accord Daniels v. Williams,
720 F.2d 792, 796 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) (Parratt would
not apply to substantive due process violations resulting from a police officer's unjustified, brutal
beating of a suspect).
110. 744 F.2d at 1500.
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members of the panel rejected the court's characterization of the claims
here as substantive due process claims, and argued that whenever state
policy denounces the infliction of a wrong, its institutions should satisfy
due process."'I Based on this division of opinion, it is readily apparent
that the Parratt debate implicates broader questions as to the meaning of
due process discussed in the previous section. 112 Hopefully the Supreme
Court will soon provide some guidance to lower courts on these
questions.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT ACTION
A. Rational Basis Analysis "With a Bite"
The Supreme Court has generally held that in cases which do not
involve either a discrete and insular minority or a fundamental right, it
suffices that the legislative scheme rationally furthers a legitimate state
interest. 11 3 Although in the past the Court took an extremely deferential
approach, generally refusing to invalidate any state laws, recent decisions
reflect a more searching scrutiny and a willingness to strike statutes
under the so-called traditional equal protection approach." 4 For exam-
ple, the Court ruled in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center115 that a city's
refusal to grant a special permit for a group home for the mentally re-
tarded was based on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded
and thus violated the equal protection clause.
The Seventh Circuit this term rejected equal protection challenges
to a Wisconsin statute, but only after subjecting the law to a fairly
searching review. Plaintiffs in Peterson v. Lindner1 6 were court report-
ers who, as a result of a court reorganization, were paid disparate sala-
ries. Prior to 1978, counties in Wisconsin awarded their court reporters
a salary supplement. After the circuit and county courts were consoli-
dated, the legislature passed a law allowing the former county court re-
porters who became circuit court reporters to continue at their earlier
salaries.' 17 A legislative committee appointed to investigate this situa-
111. Id. at 1510-11, 1514.
112. See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
113. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959
(1973)). Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
114. See, e.g., Hooper v. Bernanillo County Assessor, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985) (invalidating as
irrational a New Mexico law which limited a veteran's property tax-exemption to veterans who
moved into the state by 1976); Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (1985) (holding that a Vermont
use tax which discriminated against nonresidents who purchased cars in another state and then
moved to Vermont was arbitrary and unrelated to any legitimate statutory purpose).
115. 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985).
116. 765 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1985).
117. Id. at 701.
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tion concluded that the broad salary differentials generated by the county
supplements were irrationally based on the date, county, and status of
appointment, rather than on job proficiency. 118 Despite this finding, the
court concluded after a careful examination of the legislative history, that
the freezing of the old wages was simply a temporary measure designed
to maintain the status quo until a Qualifications and Compensation Com-
mittee could promulgate new regulations. This in fact was done in 1982,
at which time the old system was abandoned.' 19
Although recognizing the Supreme Court rule that a legislature is
entitled to act on one part of a problem at a time, the court stressed that
any "first step" justification must be supported by a deliberate design to
continue to eradicate the problem. 120 Here the legislative mandate to cre-
ate a new comprehensive system of qualifications and compensations
supported the defendant's claim that the challenged provision was in-
tended to be a temporary measure only. The court ruled that the subse-
quent actions taken by the legislature demonstrated that the statute was
rationally related to the state's ultimate, legitimate goals.
1 21
B. Equal Protection Challenges to Affirmative Action: The Reverse
Discrimination Dilemma
The Supreme Court has failed to provide any meaningful guidance
to the lower courts regarding the constitutional validity of affirmative
action programs. Although the Supreme Court considered the merits of
constitutional challenges to affirmative action plans in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke 122 and Fullilove v. Klutznick,123 in
neither case did any opinion command the assent of a majority of the
Court. Although the issues are extremely complex, basically three funda-
mental questions need to be resolved:
1. Whether affirmative action programs are justifiable only as a rem-
edy for past discrimination, and if not, what other state interests are
permissible?
2. Assuming that remedying past discriminations is a viable justifica-
tion for affirmative action, must the discrimination be specifically that
118. Id.
119. Id. at 708.
120. Id. at 706-07.
121. Id. at 708. See also Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
Chicago ordinance allowing owners of handguns on a certain date to keep them but prohibiting
others' possession was a viable "first step in a gradual approach to the problems of handgun vio.
lence." Id. at 641 n.12).
122. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
123. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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of the defendant or may government rely upon societal discrimination
as the reason for affectuating its programs?
3. Focusing on specific remedial schemes, to what extent may prefer-
ential treatment be afforded minorities without violating the constitu-
tional rights of non-minorities?
These key questions were raised in the context of two Seventh Circuit
decisions this term, and are currently being debated before the Supreme
Court in three cases.
1 24
In Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend 125 the Seventh Circuit
tackled the first question, i.e. whether a city can adopt an affirmative
action program relying solely on the statistical underrepresentation of
minorities, absent findings of past discrimination. The City of South
Bend adopted an affirmative action program for its Police and Fire De-
partments because of the disparity which existed between the percentage
of minorities in the population of South Bend and the percentage of mi-
norities in the Departments. A Minority Recruitment Task Force made
specific findings that the hiring procedures were not discriminatory; but
it recommended nonetheless that a two-to-one preferential hiring plan be
instituted so that the departments might better reflect the minority com-
position of the city. 126
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by stating its understanding
of Supreme Court precedent to require that affirmative action programs
be based upon findings by a competent body of past discrimination.
27 It
reasoned that absent a finding of past discrimination, the government
could not satisfy its constitutional burden of articulating a substantial or
important government interest for its affirmative action program. 128 Be-
cause here only evidence of statistical disparity was used to justify the
affirmative action program, the court concluded that the district court
had erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants.
29
124. The pending cases are Local 638 v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 753 F.2d
1172 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985) (raising the issue of whether general findings
of discrimination against unidentified persons justify a district court-ordered race conscious affirma-
tive action program which includes specific percentage goals); Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of
Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n. of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985) (challenging the validity of a consent decree
which, over the objection of the union, requires the promotion and maintenance of minority firefight-
ers in higher positions); and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985) (challenging race preferences for teacher lay-offs adopted by a public
employer in the absence of finding past discrimination, but based rather solely upon disparity be-
tween respective percentages of minority faculty and students).
125. 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984),petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3896 (June 10, 1985) (No.
84-1936).
126. 750 F.2d at 558.
127. Id. at 561. It stated that this same limtation was imposed by Title VII.
128. Id. at 563-64.
129. Id. at 564.
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The Seventh Circuit's presumption that findings of specific past dis-
crimination are a prerequisite to the validation of any affirmative action
program should be contrasted with the approach taken in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education,1 30 which is presently pending before the
Supreme Court. In Wygant the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the af-
firmative action program was voluntarily adopted by the School Board in
the absence of direct findings of discrimination against minority teachers.
Its purpose was to increase the percentage of minority faculty to better
reflect the percentage of minorities in the study body. In determining the
validity of that program, the court asked whether there was a sound basis
for concluding that minority underrepresentation was substantial and
chronic, and whether the handicap of past racial discrimination was im-
peding access and promotion of minorities. 31 The court felt that this
would be enough to justify preferential treatment within a general class
of persons likely to have been the victims of discrimination. The court
upheld the program because the plan's objective-to remedy past under-
representation-was constitutional, and the means were substantially re-
lated to the objective of correcting underrepresentation.1
32
The approach taken by the Sixth Circuit finds support in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,133 wherein Justice Powell reasoned
that either remedying past discrimination, or some other equally compel-
ling government interest might justify an affirmative action program. In-
deed in Bakke Justice Powell found a compelling interest in a diverse
educational environment. 134 Although he later held that the means-a
strict racial quota-were constitutionally impermissible, this does not af-
fect his conclusion that remedying past discrimination is not the only
possible justification for affirmative action. Further, four concurring Jus-
tices in Bakke argued that affirmative action programs could be sustained
upon a lesser governmental showing of a significant, rather than compel-
ling, interest and means substantially related, rather than essential, to
achieving that interest.135 The Court's review of Wygant should provide
some answer to the question of whether findings of past discrimination
are a prerequisite to any affirmative action program and, if not, what
types of government interests are sufficient to withstand a constitutional
challenge.
130. 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984) see ADDENDUM, infra page 465.
131. Id. at 1155. The court notes that this standard comes from Justice Brennan's four-man
plurality opinion in Bakke.
132. Id. at 1156-57.
133. 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978).
134. Id. at 311-14.
135. Id. at 359. (Brennan, J. concurring).
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A second Seventh Circuit reverse discrimination case, Britton v.
South Bend Community School Corp., 136 involved a collective bargaining
agreement which provided that in the event of reduction in force, lay-offs
of minority teachers hired pursuant to the school board's voluntary af-
firmative action program were prohibited. Unlike Janowiak, there was
no question here regarding past discrimination on the part of the South
Bend Community School Corporation. The Office for Civil Rights
(OFC) had conducted two on-site reviews of the school system, finding
that the school corporation was not in compliance with federal law be-
cause of racially discriminatory teacher assignment practices.13 7 Fur-
ther, the Justice Department had filed a discrimination suit against the
school corporation in 1980 which was settled by a consent order the
same day it was commenced. 138 The consent order required continuation
of an affirmative action policy adopted by the School Board to increase
the percentage of minorities on the teaching staff until that percentage
equalled or roughly approximated the percentage of minority pupils in
the student body.' 3 9 It was in furtherance of that policy that the "no
minority lay-off" clause was proposed by the school corporation, agreed
to by the teacher's negotiators and ratified by the union teachers.'
4
0
The Seventh Circuit upheld the affirmative action program against
both Title VII and equal protection claims. After analyzing the Title VII
challenge, 141 the court interpreted previous Supreme Court precedent re-
garding the equal protection clause to require that the government action
serve some interest and that the program somehow be directed towards
achieving that interest.' 42 Although noting the disagreement on the part
of Supreme Court Justices as to whether remedying the effects of past
societal discrimination constitutes a sufficiently compelling government
interest to warrant affirmative action, here there had been explicit find-
ings of the defendant's discrimination by three competent bodies, i.e. the
Office of Civil Rights, a district court, and the Attorney General's certifi-
136. 775 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1985)judgment vacated reh'g en banc granted, No. 84-2841 (Feb. 12,
1986).
137. Id. at 799.
138. Id. at 800-01.
139. Id. at 801.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 802-08. Basically the court's analysis under the fourteenth amendment parallels quite
closely its interpretation of the Title VII standard set forth in United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), i.e. that an affirmative action program be based upon some finding of
past discrimination by a competent body, and that the means do not "unnecessarily trammel the
interests of white employees." 443 U.S. at 208.
142. Britton, 775 F.2d at 809. The court states that this is the only clear consensus which may
be garnered from the diversified Supreme Court opinions (citing Janowiak, 750 F.2d at 563.
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cation underlying the consent order. 143
As to the question of remedy, the court, without specifying a partic-
ular standard, held that the means here were not only related to, but
were essential and crucial to the achievement of the affirmative action
objectives. 144 It stressed that the provision did not stigmatize any of the
white teachers who were laid off; it did not require the retention of un-
qualified teachers, nor the lay-off of all white teachers; and it was a tem-
porary measure not designed to maintain a particular racial balance in
the teaching staff.
14 5
The toughest claim made by the plaintiffs was that less burdensome
lay-off procedures would have been possible, short of the "no minority
lay-off" provision adopted. As to this argument, the court ruled that
without the provision, the percentage of black teachers would have
dropped to what it had been before the affirmative action program was
adopted. 146 Further, a proposal such as that adopted in the Wygant case,
i.e. that the school system simply maintain the percentages of black
teachers already achieved at the time of lay-offs, would not have signifi-
cantly enhanced the protection for non-minorities and would have under-
cut the goal of increasing the percentages of minority teachers in the
school system. 147
Questions as to the viability of affirmative action programs are being
raised in two cases pending in the Supreme Court. In one, a court-or-
dered affirmative action program establishing a 29.23% nonwhite mem-
bership "goal" for the sheet metal workers' union and other special
preferences in training programs for minorities are being challenged.
1 48
The court order came as a result of judicial findings that the union and
its joint Apprenticeship Committee had purposefully discriminated
against nonwhites in violation of Title VII.149 The second case involves a
labor union's challenge to a consent decree which required the promo-
tion of minority firefighters to higher positions in the Department.
1 50
143. Id. at 809-11.
144. Id. at 812. See id. at 811-12 for a discussion of the standards adopted by various circuits on
this question.
145. Id. at 812-13.
146. Id. at 813.
147. "Lay-offs pursuant to such a provision would have kept the percentage of black teachers at
13.0%, while the actual lay-offs pursuant to the no minority plan increased the percentage to
13.8%." Id.
148. Local 28 v. EEOC, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.) see ADDENDUM, infra page 465.
149. Id. at 1175. The case arose in the context of contempt proceedings for violations of the
court order, and also raises legal issues as to the use of this contempt power.
150. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert. granted sub
noma. Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland see ADDENDUM, infra page 465.
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Again here the district court made specific findings of race discrimination
in promotions in the defendant's Fire Department.' 5 1 The union's con-
tention that the affirmative action plan was unreasonable because "it pe-
nalizes innocent non-minority firefighters" was rejected by the Sixth
Circuit. 152
The most significant issue raised by both of these cases is whether
affirmative action programs may include those who are not actual victims
of past racial discrimination. The Justice Department has adopted a new
policy which would limit affirmative action programs to those who are
actual victims of discrimination, while opposing any other types of pref-
erential treatment. 53 Although thus far the Administration has failed to
convince any federal appellate courts of its arguments, certainly Supreme
Court guidance is needed both regarding the validity of the Administra-
tion's "victim-specificity" requirement, and more generally as to the
standard of review which should be utilized when challenges are made to
affirmative action programs on grounds that they impermissibly violate
the equal protection rights of non-minorities.
IV. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Age Discrimination
The cases brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) 154 and considered by the court this term generally fit into
two categories: those addressing the requirements of a prima facie case
of age discrimination and those dealing with the timeliness of the
charges. 155 It is generally accepted that the method of proof established
151. Id. at 483.
152. Id. at 484-85. The court stressed that the plan did not require hiring unqualified minority
firefighters, it did not create an absolute bar to the advancement of non-minority employees, and it
was both flexible and temporary.
153. This is the position advocated in briefs submitted by the Justice Department in the pending
cases.
154. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1985).
155. A significant number of the ADEA cases were disposed of in the trial courts by summary
judgment. An order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant was reversed in Stumph
v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc., 770 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1985), with an indication that summary judgment
is inappropriate in a discrimination case "where a material issue involves any weighing of conflicting
indications of motive and intent." Id. at 97. The court also indicated that a plaintiff opposing
summary judgment "should be required to do no more than offer proof which casts doubt upon the
veracity of the employer's stated reason for its action." Id. at 98. See also Herman v. Nat'l Broad-
casting Co., 744 F.2d 604, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1393 (1985) (affidavit of
defendant's official indicating he had selected the "best applicants" without considering the ages of
any of the applicants was insufficient to warrant summary judgment for the defendant on a claim of
willful discrimination where those making the selection had requested the applicants' dates of birth,
there was evidence of past age discrimination by the employer and statistical evidence indicating that
the twenty persons hired pursuant to job postings for particular years were all under 50 years of age).
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in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 156 applies in ADEA cases. 157
Where a plaintiff is replaced by a younger person, the court stated in
Stumph v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc.15 8 that he could establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination by showing that:
(1) he was a member of the protected class (persons aged 40 to 70);
(2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he was terminated; and (4) he
was replaced in his position by a younger person.159
A problem arises with the fourth factor in a case where an employer
is reducing the work force. In such a case, Tice v. Lampert Yards,
Inc.,160 the court indicated that "replacement of the plaintiff by a
younger person may not be required in order to establish a prima facie
case."' 161 Subsequently, in Matthews v. Allis Chalmers, 62 the majority
adopted the Fifth Circuit's version of the fourth factor 163 and required
the plaintiff to produce "circumstantial or direct evidence from which a
factfinder might reasonably conclude that the employer intended to dis-
criminate in making the employment decision at issue." 164 Judge Flaum,
in a concurring opinion, discusses the different approaches taken in the
circuits and argues that the Williams approach "upsets the delicate bal-
ance in burdens of proof that was struck by the Supreme Court in Mc-
Donnell Douglas."'' 65 He correctly argues that the test adopted by the
majority, based on Williams, is too strict for plaintiffs and "threatens to
undermine the function of McDonnell Douglas in providing plaintiffs
with a meaningful opportunity to litigate their discrimination claims."'1 66
Instead, Judge Flaum would allow a plaintiff in a reduction-in-force case
to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination "by showing that he
Summary judgment for the defendant was upheld in Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215
(7th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff did not produce any indication of discriminatory motive and intent), and
Trembath v. St. Regis Paper Co., 753 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1985) (no genuine issue of fact as to one
item of plaintiffs' prima facie case, i.e. whether there was an available job open when the plaintiffs
were discharged).
156. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
157. See, e.g., Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1212 (7th Cir. 1985); Trembath v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 753 F.2d 603, 604 (7th Cir. 1985); LaMontagne v. American Convenience Prod.,
Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir. 1984).
158. 770 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1985).
159. Id. at 96 (citations omitted).
160. 761 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1985).
161. Id. at 1215 n.5. See also Stumph v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc., 770 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1985)
(error for the district court to hold that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of age discrimi-
nation because he failed to show replacement by a younger employee).
162. 769 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1985).
163. Id. at 1217. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
164. 769 F.2d at 1217.
165. Id. at 1222 (Flaum, J., concurring).
166. Id.
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was in the protected age group, that he was performing according to his
employer's legitimate expectations, and that he was discharged while
younger employees either were retained to perform the plaintiff's job or
permitted to transfer into some other job for which the plaintiff was qual-
ified." 1 67 Judge Flaum's approach seems much better suited to accom-
plish the purposes of McDonnell Douglas in light of the special
circumstances surrounding a reduction in force.
The court dealt with both of the limitation periods which govern
ADEA cases. In Stearns v. Consolidated Management, Inc. 168 the court
confirmed that the administrative filing requirements under the ADEA
are not jurisdictional, and it reversed the lower court's dismissal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.1 69 Since filing with the EEOC is not juris-
dictional, questions frequently arise as to whether the 180 day period 170
has been equitably tolled. More specifically, the question relates to the
date the EEOC filing deadline begins to run. For example, in Vaught v.
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. 171 the plaintiff was demoted in October 1979
and knew he was being replaced by a younger employee. In December
1980 the plaintiff learned for the first time that the defendant had re-
moved most middle-level managers over age fifty. He filed his EEOC
charge within 180 days of December 1980, but more than 180 days from
October 1979. The court adopted the test from Reeb v. Economic Oppor-
tunity Atlanta, Inc. 172 which held that the EEOC filing deadline is tolled
167. Id. at 1224. Utilizing his standard, Judge Flaum indicated the plaintiff had established a
prima facie case of age discrimination, but he concurred in the result because the defendant provided
a nondiscriminatory justification for the discharge and the plaintiff offered no evidence to show that
the justification was a pretext. Id.
168. 747 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1984).
169. The lower court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the charge had
been forwarded to the EEOC by the state agency, rather than by the plaintiff. Noting that the
ADEA is "humanitarian legislation that should not be construed in a hypertechnical manner," 747
F.2d at 1112, the Seventh Circuit held that the purpose of filing with the EEOC had been served,
regardless of who forwarded the charge to the EEOC.
170. Under the ADEA, charges must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days, unless the state
has an agency authorized to remedy age discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). In Anderson v. Ill.
Tool Works, Inc., 753 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1985), the court held that in a deferral state, such as
Illinois, the charging party does not have to file with the state agency, either within the state agency's
limitations period or the 180 days, as long as a charge is filed with the EEOC within the extended
300-day period. Of course, charging parties must still be concerned with the holding in Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980), that a charge is not "filed" with the EEOC until the appropriate
state agency has had 60 days to consider the charge. In Vaught v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 745
F.2d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 1984), the court noted that Indiana is not a deferral state and therefore
ADEA charges must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days. See also Heiar v. Crawford County,
Wise., 746 F.2d 1190, 1194-96 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3500 (1985) (Wisconsin is a
deferral state and therefore the 300-day period applies, even in cases arguably exempted from the
state law).
171. 745 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1984).
172. 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
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until the time when "facts that would support a charge of discrimination
were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reason-
ably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff.'
73
Because the plaintiff was aware of facts in October 1979 which would
support an age discrimination charge, his charge was untimely. It is not
necessary that he be aware of facts sufficient to make out a prima facie
case.
The ADEA also requires that suits be brought "within two years
after the cause of action has accrued" unless there is a willful violation of
the Act, in which case the limitations period is three years.t 74 The de-
fendant in Heiar v. Crawford County, Wisconsin 7.5 was precluded from
arguing the statute of limitations defense in the court of appeals because,
even though the county had raised it as an affirmative defense in the
district court, the defense was subsequently abandoned and not preserved
in the pre-trial order. The court also held that the district courts have
discretion to award prejudgment interest in cases finding nonwillful vio-
lations of the ADEA to compensate plaintiffs for the delay in receipt of
wages. ' 7
6
The underlying issue in Heiar was whether the county's mandatory
retirement age of 55 for deputy sheriffs constitutes a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification within the meaning of a statutory exception provided
in the ADEA. 177 The defense was rejected because the employer did not
present persuasive evidence that it needed a mandatory retirement age, as
required by Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Department:78
The county failed in this case to persuade the district judge that
there was "a factual basis" for believing that "substantially all employ-
ees" aged 55 or older would be unable to perform their duties safely
and efficiently because of the "particularly arduous" nature of the em-
ployment, and that medical or other objective tests to determine the
capacity of older workers on an individual basis were infeasible.1
79
Also, the court rejected the defendant's argument based on the federal
statute 80 which generally requires federal law enforcement officers to re-
tire at age fifty-five.t 8'
173. Id. at 931.
174. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (incorporated by 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1)).
175. 746 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3500 (1985).
176. Id. at 1201.
177. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
178. 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
179. 746 F.2d at 1200.
180. 5 U.S.C. § 8335(b).
181. This is consistent with Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 105 S. Ct. 2717
(1985), in which the Court held that the federal statute generally requiring federal firefighters to
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The holding in Heiar is consistent with the recent decision in West-
ern Airlines v. Criswel118 2 in which the Supreme Court rejected the air-
line's bona fide occupational qualification defense for its requirement that
flight engineers retire at age sixty. The Court held that the BFOQ excep-
tion was meant to be extremely narrow and when the BFOQ defense is
based on safety interests, the relevant considerations are whether the job
qualification is reasonably necessary to the overriding interest in public
safety and whether the employer is compelled to rely on age as a proxy
for the safety-related job qualification. As to the latter, the employer
must establish either that it had reasonable cause to believe that all or
substantially all persons over the age qualification would be unable to
perform safely the duties of the job or that it is highly impractical to deal
with the older employees on an individualized basis. 183 Consistent with
this, the Court held that the trial court properly rejected Western's pro-
posed jury instruction which would have allowed it to succeed on the
BFOQ defense by proving "that in 1978, when these plaintiffs were re-
tired, there existed a rational basis in fact for defendant to believe that
the use of [flight engineers] over age sixty on its DC-10 airliners would
increase the likelihood of risk to its passengers."'
' 8 4
B. Title VII-Sex Discrimination
Two cases of sex discrimination, one challenging a denial of a pro-
motion and the other claiming sexual harassment, will be discussed
here.' 8 5 The plaintiff in Caviale v. State of Wisconsin Department of
Health & Social Services186 claimed she had been denied a promotion
because of the department's decision to limit application eligibility for
the new regional director position to current members of a career execu-
tive program, all of whom were men. The lower court ruled that she
retire at age 55 does not establish, as a matter of law, that age 55 is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation for nonfederal firefighters under the ADEA.
182. 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985).
183. Id. at 2751-53.
184. Id. at 2753 (emphasis in original).
185. Other cases claiming sex discrimination in violation of Title VII include Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2023 (1985) (discharging the
plaintiff because she was a transsexual does not constitute "sex" discrimination within the meaning
of Title VII); St. Louis v. Alverno College, 744 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff who moved but
failed to advise the EEOC of the move does not have 90 days from actual receipt of the right to sue
letter to initiate judicial proceedings); Epstein v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 739 F.2d 274
(7th Cir. 1984) (defendants articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not upgrading the
plaintiff's position, even though the position of a similarly situated male was upgraded, which was
not a pretext for discrimination). In the latter case, the plaintiff's Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1), claim was also rejected because the lower court's finding that the jobs did not involve
equal work was not clearly erroneous.
186. 744 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1984).
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failed to establish a prima facie case and, even if she established such a
case, the defendant met its burden of proving that its selection method
was a business necessity. To establish a prima facie case, the court held
that the plaintiff had to show (1) that she was qualified for the position of
regional director, 87 (2) that she is a member of a group protected under
Title VII, and (3) that the challenged selection criterion imposed a dis-
proportionate burden upon women qualified for the position. 8 8 Because
the lower court found that the challenged selection criterion "substan-
tially limited" the number of otherwise qualified women available to ap-
ply, more than it limited the number of qualified men, the court of
appeals found that the plaintiff necessarily satisfied the third
requirement.
As to the business necessity defense, the court found no evidence in
the record showing membership in the career executive program was a
job-related selection criterion. The record "fails to reveal a close match
between the skills that the career executives possessed and the skills re-
quired in the position"1 89 sought by the plaintiff. Even though the court
found that the plaintiff had established liability for discrimination in vio-
lation of Title VII, it remanded the remedy question because the plaintiff
is not entitled to lost wages if it turns out the male selected was better
qualified for the position and would have been appointed even if the
plaintiff had been allowed to compete. On this causation issue, the court
held that the defendant must "bear the burden of proving [the plaintiff's]
inevitable rejection."1 90 The burden was allocated to the defendant be-
cause the facts relating to this issue are peculiarly within its
knowledge. 1 91
In Horn v. Duke Homes, Division of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc.
92
the plaintiff claimed she was discharged by the defendant, because of her
refusal to respond to the sexual advances of the plant superintendent, in
violation of Title VII. On appeal the defendant challenged the liability
determination on the basis of a lower court finding that the supervisory
hierarchy above the plant superintendent neither knew nor approved of
the superintendent's sexual misconduct. In rejecting the defendant's ar-
187. Id. at 1293. This requires only that she meet the "objective" qualifications, not the "subjec-
tive" qualities that the employer might find desirable. Id. at 1294.
188. Id. at 1293.
189. Id. at 1295.
190. Id. at 1296.
191. Id. See also McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 745 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2139 (1985) (after liability has been established, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), rather than Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981), controls the proof scheme for remedy issues).
192. 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985).
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gument, the Seventh Circuit adopted the EEOC regulation which im-
poses strict liability on employers for the acts of sexual harassment
committed by their supervisory employees. 193 The court referred to sev-
eral policy justifications for the EEOC regulation: (1) a company acts
only through its supervisory personnel and when they have authority to
hire and fire they are the company; (2) the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior imposes liability on principals for the intentional torts of their
agents; and (3) in passing Title VII Congress determined that employers,
rather than the victims of discrimination, should bear the cost of remedy-
ing and eradicating employment discrimination. 194 The court went on to
reverse the district judge's denial of back-pay, holding there were no
"special factors" to justify the denial. 195
C. Racial Discrimination
Only two cases involving racial discrimination in employment will
be discussed here. 196 In Aguilera v. Cook County Police & Merit
Board 197 the court considered whether a county requirement that correc-
tion officers have a high school diploma or high school equivalency cer-
tificate satisfies the requirement that there be "a reasonably tight fit
between the challenged criterion and the actual demands of the job."'198
Even though this requirement had not been "validated" and the record
did not contain sworn evidence that the requirement of a high school
1 193. 29 CFR § 1604.11(c) (1985). The court expressly indicated it was not addressing the ques-
tion whether actual or constructive knowledge is required to hold an employer liable for sexual
harrassment by a co-employee. 755 F.2d at 603 n.2. See Vinson, ADDENDUM, infra page 465.
194. 755 F.2d at 604-06.
195. This aspect of the case was remanded for further fact-finding. Because the plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable estimate at lost wages, the burden shifted to the
employer to rebut that evidence or show the plaintiff failed to take reasonable efforts to mitigate her
loss. Id. at 606-08.
196. Two other cases involving racial discrimination, Mozee v. Jeffboat, Inc., 746 F.2d 365 (7th
Cir. 1984), and Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1985), involved the trial court's
weighing of the evidence and findings of fact. In the former, the judgment for the defendant was
vacated and remanded for a new trial because the findings of fact were insufficient to permit mean-
ingful appellate review. In a third case, Jones v. Madison Serv. Corp. & American Transit Corp.,
744 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1984), summary judgment for the defendant was upheld because the plain-
tiffs did not initiate the lawsuit within 90 days of receipt of the notice of right to sue letters by their
attorney. The court held that the 90-day limitation period begins to run "on the date that the EEOC
right to sue notice is actually received either by the claimant or by the attorney representing him in
the Title VII action." 744 F.2d at 1314. Finally, in Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 766
F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1985), the court held that a plaintiff claiming race and sex discrimination by her
state government employer can sue under § 1983 claiming violations of the fourteenth amendment
and thereby escape the comprehensive remedial scheme under Title VII, even if the same facts would
give rise to a Title VII claim.
197. 760 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1985).
198. Id. at 847 (citing Caviale v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 744 F.2d 1289,
1294 (7th Cir. 1984)). See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
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education is "job related," the court upheld a grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant. This was based on a
[p]resumption which we derived from the previous cases that requiring
law enforcement officers to have a high school education is appropri-
ate, here reinforced by the literature we have reviewed concerning the
needs and practices in the selection of corrections officers around the
nation, by the documents of record concerning the training and re-
sponsibilities of Cook County jail guards and by the requirement-not
challenged as unreasonable-that such guards undergo college-level
training .... 199
In essence, the court decided there had been enough judicial and profes-
sional experience with educational requirements in law enforcement to
establish a presumption in favor of such requirements and "to excuse
civil rights defendants from having to prove, over and over again, that
such requirements really are necessary for such jobs. ' ' 2°° This decision
certainly makes it much less burdensome for defendants, particularly af-
ter extensive litigation regarding a requirement of employment, to show
that a requirement is job related and necessary.
An issue of first impression was presented in Musikiwamba v. Essi,
Inc. ,201 i.e., whether the successor doctrine applies to claims of employ-
ment discrimination brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.202 In
holding that the doctrine can be applied to section 1981 claims for em-
ployment discrimination, the court focused on two critical factors. First,
because the successor doctrine is derived from equitable principles, it is
important to determine whether the successor company had notice of the
charge or pending lawsuit prior to acquiring the business or assets of the
predecessor. Second, it is important to determine whether the predeces-
sor could have provided any or all relief to the plaintiff prior to the trans-
fer of assets. Several other factors should be considered, 203 but they
"merely provide a foundation for analyzing the larger question of
whether there is a continuity in operations and the work force of the
successor and the predecessor employers. ' '2°4 The case was remanded to
give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint to properly state
a claim under the successor doctrine.
199. 760 F.2d at 847.
200. Id. at 848.
201. 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
203. See list, 760 F.2d at 750, adopted from Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Mac-
Millan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1094 (6th Cir. 1974).
204. 760 F.2d at 751.
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D. Title VII-Retaliation for Initiating Charges
Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964205 prohibits retalia-
tion by an employer against employees for opposing unlawful employ-
ment practices. The plaintiffs in Mozee v. Jeffboat, Inc.20 6 alleged their
employer retaliated against them for participating in protests against its
treatment of black workers; the protests were held on workdays and re-
quired that participants be absent from work. The district court finding
in favor of the employer was reversed. To prevail on the retaliation
claim, the court indicated the plaintiffs "had to show, as a threshold mat-
ter, that they reasonably believed that Jeftboat practiced unlawful dis-
crimination and that their opposition to the discrimination caused the
employer to take the adverse action alleged. ' 20 7 Concerning the possibil-
ity of disruption caused by the plaintiffs' absences, the court held that
this should be balanced against the employees' interest in lawful opposi-
tion to employment discrimination. Therefore, an employee's refusal to
report to work may be protected by the Title VII prohibition on retalia-
tion so long as it is neither excessively disruptive nor unlawful.
E. Title VII-Application of Preclusion Principles
Discrimination charges filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 frequently present preclusion issues because of the statutory re-
quirement that charges be deferred to state agencies. In Kremer v.
Chemical Construction Corp.20 8 the plaintiff pursued his discrimination
charge through the New York administration agency and then appealed
an adverse decision to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York. The state court unanimously "confirmed" the decision of the
Agency Appeals Board holding that there had been no discrimination.
Based on the federal statute which requires federal courts to give the
same preclusive effect to state court judgments that they would be given
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
206. 746 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1984).
207. Id. at 373. In Klein v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 766 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1985), the court held
that a plaintiff, to make a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, must show: "(1) He opposed an
employment practice that was unlawful within the meaning of Title VII or he participated in a
proceeding under Title VII; (2) he suffered an adverse action by his employer; (3) because of his
opposition or participation." 766 F.2d at 280. The court upheld a grant of summary judgment for
the defendant even though the plaintiff established a prima facie case because the defendants
presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision and the plaintiff failed
to present evidence sufficiently substantial to raise a material issue of fact as to whether the defend-
ant's proffered reason for its employment decision was pretextual. See also Hearn v. R.R. Donnelley
& Sons Co., 735 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1219 (1985) (lower court finding of
retaliation reversed as clearly erroneous because the plaintiff failed to establish that the legitimate
reason stated by the defendant for not hiring the plaintiff was merely pretextual).
208. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
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in the courts of the state,20 9 the Court concluded that the state court
decision upholding the agency's rejection of the discrimination claim as
meritless was entitled to preclusive effect in the federal court action
under Title VII. In a footnote, the court in Kremer stated:
[s]ince it is settled that decisions by the EEOC do not preclude a trial
de novo in federal court, it is clear that unreviewed administrative de-
terminations by state agencies also should not preclude such review
even if such a decision were to be afforded preclusive effect in a State's
own court.
2 10
The Seventh Circuit, in Buckhalter v. Pepsi Cola General Bottlers,
Inc. ,21 t held that footnote 7 in Kremer refers only to a state administra-
tive agency acting in its investigatory capacity, as opposed to its adjudi-
catory capacity. Therefore, because the plaintiff had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his claim of race discrimination before the Illinois
Human Rights Commission, with thorough procedural and evidentiary
safeguards, the court applied administrative res judicata and held that
the Title VII action in federal court was precluded. The court indicated
that its application of administrative res judicata should be narrowly con-
strued and "used only in those situations where the state administrative
agency, while acting in a judicial capacity, has reviewed the merits of the
complainant's employment discrimination claim and has ruled that the
evidence does not support such a claim. '212
A related issue arose in a Title VII action brought by a black police
officer who was discharged following a hearing before the Civil Service
Commission. During his hearing before the Commission he attempted to
introduce evidence tending to show that white officers involved in activi-
ties as bad as or worse than his had not been recommended for discharge.
The discharge was upheld in the plaintiff's appeals to the state courts.
Because the plaintiff tried to raise his defense of racial discrimination, but
neither the commission nor the state courts would consider it, the court
209. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1985).
210. 456 U.S. at 470 n.7.
211. 768 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3328 (1986) (in light of Elliott). See
Elliott, ADDENDUM, infra page 465.
212. Id. at 854. Relying on McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984),
holding that arbitration is not a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of § 1738, the court stated
that § 1738 does not apply to this case. Instead it relied upon the judge-made doctrine of adminis-
trative res judicata. The court distinguished Patzer v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 763
F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1985), where the plaintiff prevailed on his claim of discrimination before the
Wisconsin Administrative Agency but did not receive back-pay because it was not authorized under
Wisconsin law. This was affirmed by a state court, and the plaintiff then filed a state court complaint
seeking damages and lost wages. The case was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. He then
filed an action in federal court under Title VII, seeking back-pay and the restoration of benefits. The
court held that under Wisconsin law the second suit would not be barred by res judicata because the
relief sought in federal court was not available in the state proceedings.
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in Jones v. City of Alton, 111.213 held he was not barred from litigating the
racial discrimination claim in federal court.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS
Only a few cases decided this term address significant enforcement
issues. One of the cases, Toledo, Peoria, & Western Railroad v. State of
Illinois, Department of Transportation,214 involved two issues which arise
in § 1983 actions against state agencies and officials. The plaintiff sued
the Illinois Department of Transportation, its secretary and two of its
employees seeking damages and injunctive relief. First, the court held
that state agencies are not "persons" for purposes of actions under sec-
tion 1983. Based on this determination, it dismissed the section 1983
action against the state agency "for lack of federal court jurisdiction. ' 215
The dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction seems inappropriate.
In determining whether a state agency is a "person" under section 1983,
the court is interpreting a federal statute. This presents a federal ques-
tion and the court has jurisdiction under section 1331216 to determine
whether the plaintiff states a claim. The more appropriate ruling would
have been a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 217
In the other aspect of the case, the court held that state officials are per-
sons under section 1983, but applying Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman,218 it ruled that the eleventh amendment bars even injunc-
tive relief against state officials based on state law. 219
213. 757 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1985). The court distinguished Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196
(7th Cir. 1982), because there the discharged police officer made no attempt to raise his race discrim-
ination claim before the Administrative Board which ruled on his discharge. Cf Vandenplas v. City
of Muskego, 753 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3481 (1985) (federal constitutional
claims barred because they could have been raised as an affirmative defense to the reasonableness of
a "raze order" issued by a state court).
214. 744 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1751 (1985).
215. Id. at 1299.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1985).
217. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This approach is consistent with Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946) (federal court has jurisdiction to determine whether the plaintiff states a cause of action under
the constitution). The difference in the two approaches is that a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) repre-
sents a ruling on the merits of the claim as stated and would preclude relitigation of the same claim.
218. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
219. 744 F.2d at 1299. While the court is correct in holding that Pennhurst prohibits injunctive
relief against state officials sued in federal court on state claims, it did not point out that the federal
courts can award damages against such officials, in their individual capacity, based on violations of
state law. This suggests the importance of indicating in the complaint the capacity in which govern-
ment officials are sued - official, individual or both. In Kolar v. County of Sangamon of the State of
Ill., 756 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1985), the court noted that attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 can be
awarded only where officials are sued in their official capacity. Relying on Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 700 (1978), it held that fee awards against an official sued in his individual capacity are not
governed by § 1988, but can be awarded under the traditional bad faith standard and paid by the
individual official rather than the government employer. Addressing the problem created by unclear
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In a lengthy opinion the court dealt with several enforcement issues
raised by claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986. Daniel
Bell was killed in 1958 while being chased by several Milwaukee police
officers and this suit was filed by his sister and brothers on behalf of
themselves, the estate of Daniel Bell and the estate of the now deceased
father of Daniel Bell. Although the killing took place in 1958 and this
action was not commenced until 1979, it was not barred by the statute of
limitations because of the Wisconsin doctrine of estoppel by fraudulent
concealment. 220 The jury awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages
and $25,000 in punitive damages to the estate of Daniel Bell for the loss
of his life and enjoyment thereof; $75,000 in compensatory damages to
the estate of Daniel's father for loss of society and companionship;
$100,000 to the siblings for loss of society and companionship; as a result
of a conspiracy to cover up the facts of the shooting and killing, the
estate of Daniel's father was awarded $75,000 for deprivation of due pro-
cess and $150,000 for deprivation of racial equality; as a result of the
same conspiracy the siblings were awarded $540,000; finally, the jury
awarded substantial punitive damages as a result of the conspiracy.
The primary issue in the case involved the relationship between Wis-
consin wrongful death and survivor statutes and the federal civil rights
statutes. In considering the appropriateness of the damage awards the
court, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, first looked to state law. Based
on Robertson v. Wegmann 221 the court outlined the process for selection
of the appropriate substantive law in civil rights cases. First, it must be
determined whether the civil rights acts are deficient in providing a par-
ticular rule. If yes, state law is examined to fill in the gaps in the federal
provisions. Finally, state law must be disregarded in favor of federal law
if the state law is inconsistent with the meaning and purpose of federal
statutory and constitutional law.
Looking to Wisconsin law, the court found that its statutory scheme
creates a survival action in favor of the estate for pre-death injuries and a
wrongful death action in favor of the victim's survivors, but neither ac-
tion allows recovery of damages for loss of life itself. The court held the
Wisconsin law is inconsistent with the deterrent policy of § 1983 and the
fourteenth amendment's protection of life, and therefore concluded that
the Wisconsin law would not be applied to preclude the $100,000 damage
pleadings, the court indicated it will assume governmental officials sued under § 1983 are sued only
in their official capacity unless the complaint expressly refers to their individual capacity as well.
756 F.2d at 568.
220. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1231 (7th Cir. 1984).
221. 436 U.S. 584, 587-90 (1978).
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award to Daniel Bell's estate for loss of life. 222 For the same reason, an
award of $25,000 in punitive damages to Daniel Bell's estate was upheld,
even though Wisconsin law would not allow the victim's estate to recover
such damages.
22 3
Regarding the jury award for loss of society and companionship, the
court determined that Wisconsin law would preclude the siblings' recov-
ery and allow the father's estate $25,000 at best. Before determining
whether the limitations of Wisconsin law control, the court considered
whether either the father or the siblings have a constitutional liberty in-
terest in their association with Daniel Bell, such that application of Wis-
consin law would be contrary to federal law. Indicating the Supreme
Court has not addressed this question, the court reviewed decisions deal-
ing with the family relationship and concluded that a father does have a
liberty interest in the association with his son and therefore can recover
under section 1983 for the unlawful breach of the parent-child relation-
ship by virtue of the child's death.224 However, based on its review of
these same decisions, the court concluded that siblings do not have a
constitutional liberty interest in association with their brother.
The determination that the due process clause protects a parent's
relationship with his child from unlawful interference for which section
1983 would appear to provide a remedy did not, however, end the in-
quiry. The court indicated it had to consider whether there is implicit in
section 1983 a common law limitation on the remedy. 225 After reviewing
the history of section 1983, it concluded that there was no controlling
common law operative at the time it was enacted which would bar the
father's estate from recovering damages for loss of society and
companionship. 22
6
Because several police officers had conspired to cover up the actions
222. 746 F.2d at 1234-41.
223. Id. at 1241.
224. Id. at 1242-45.
225. Id. at 1248-50. This is required, the court stated because § 1983 must be read against the
"background" of common law tort remedies. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (look to com-
mon law for standard of conduct regarding imposition of punitive damages); City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (common law ruling shielding municipalities from punitive dam-
ages incorporated into § 1983).
226. 746 F.2d 1250. The court also considered the effect of the Wisconsin wrongful death stat-
ute which creates a hierarchy of beneficiaries; parents can recover only if the victim leaves no chil-
dren or spouse; the victim's siblings are next in the order of recovery, eligible if the victim leaves no
parents. The statute also limits recovery for loss of society and companionship to $25,000. The
court found that under Wisconsin law the siblings could not recover for loss of society and compan-
ionship, a result consistent with its ruling under § 1983. After again considering the purpose of
damage awards under § 1983, the court also concluded that the father's estate would not be bound
by the state limitation on damages for loss of society and companionship and therefore affirmed the
jury award of $75,000.
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surrounding the death of Daniel Bell, the court held that the surviving
siblings could recover under section 1985(3) for violation of their four-
teenth amendment right to due process. 227 The jury's award of compen-
satory damages for the conspiracy was affirmed and punitive damages
were also awarded against several of the defendants, raising the question
whether the city could be held liable for punitive damages assessed
against individual police officers. The court first ruled that the Supreme
Court decision in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. ,228 holding mu-
nicipalities immune from punitive damages in a section 1983 action, ap-
plies to sections 1981 and 1985 as well. However, the court proceeded to
rule that a Wisconsin statute, which provides indemnification by the
political subdivision for a defendant public employee against whom a
damage judgment is entered for activities within the scope of employ-
ment, waived the city's immunity under City of Newport. Therefore, the
City of Milwaukee is liable for the punitive damages assessed against two
of the police officers.
229
Finally, the court held that Milwaukee County could not be held
liable for the activity of the district attorney because the evidence did not
indicate that his conduct constituted a custom, policy, or practice of the
county under Monell v. Department of Social Services.230 The district
attorney's participation in the conspiracy was simply conduct in a single
case, and the court held that a custom, policy or practice could normally
not be inferred from a single incident of unconstitutional behavior.231
The court considered attorney fee issues under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in
several cases, but did not decide any important questions. In Lynch v.
City of Milwaukee232 the court indicated that the decision in Hensley v.
Eckerhart 233 requires two modifications to the Seventh Circuit's previous
227. Id. at 1260-65. The court held that the conspiracy deprived the siblings of property without
due process of law and obstructed their right of access to the courts in that the conspiracy prevented
the prosecution of a valid claim.
228. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
229. 746 F.2d at 1268-72. See also Kolar v. County of Sangamon of the State of Ill., 756 F.2d
564, 567 (7th Cir. 1985).
230. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
231. 746 F.2d at 1272. Several other cases dealt with the related question of whether a supervi-
sor, employed by a municipality, could be held liable for the actions of one of the employees super-
vised. In McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1984), the court recognized that
§ 1983 does not impose strict liability on the supervisor, but the supervisor is liable if "he was negli-
gent, whether in selecting or supervising or failing to discharge his subordinates, and that his negli-
gence was causally related to their more direct wrongdoing." 750 F.2d at 1391. See also Smith v.
Rowe, 761 F.2d 360, 369 (7th Cir. 1985) (sufficient evidence to link the Director of the Illinois
Department of Corrections to the continued punitive segregation of the plaintiff); Harris v. Greer,
750 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1984). See Pembaur, ADDENDUM, infra page 465.
232. 747 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1984).
233. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
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approach. First, Hensley implicitly rejected the position that fees should
be awarded only for those specific claims on which the plaintiff prevailed,
and second it emphasized that considerable attention must be given to
the relationship between the extent of success and the amount of the
award. 234  In another case, McKinnen v. City of Berwyn, 235 the court
recognized that the Supreme Court in Blum v. Stenson 236 left open the
question whether the risk of losing is a permissible factor in considering a
prevailing plaintiff's request for use of a multiplier or a bonus in assess-
ing fees, but affirmed its earlier holding that the risk of losing alone does
not justify the use of a multiplier.237 Finally, in Lampher v. Zage1238 the
court, relying on New York Gas Club, Inc. v. Carey,239 held that a federal
court plaintiff could recover fees under section 1988 for time spent in a
related state court proceeding, initiated by the federal court defendants,
because the efforts in the state court contributed to the favorable
outcome.
ADDENDUM
The three affirmative action cases, discussed at pp. 447-451 were de-
cided as follows: in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education ,24 the Court
without reaching a consensus as to the standard of review, reversed the
Sixth Circuit and invalidated the no-minority layoff provision; in Local
28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,241 it upheld the minority hiring
goal, rejecting the victim specificity requirement discussed in the text;
and in Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland,242 it held that consent decrees
are to be treated as voluntary affirmative action plans, not limited by the
constraints imposed on a court's remedial power.
The following three Supreme Court decisions are also relevant to
issues discussed above at pp. 456-57, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vin-
son, 2 4 3 (sexual harassment creating a hostile environment violates Title
234. 747 F.2d at 427. For an earlier discussion of Hensley and the Seventh Circuit's application
of it, see Bodensteiner & Levinson, Civil Liberties: 1983-84 Current Developments in Civil Liberties,
61 CH.-KENT L. REV. 229, 265-66 (1985). See also City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686
(1986) (amount of fees awarded to plaintiff not limited by amount of damages recovered).
235. 750 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1984).
236. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
237. 750 F.2d at 1392. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 657 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1981); In re I11.
Congressional District's Reapportionment Cases, 704 F.2d 380, 382 (7th Cir. 1983).
238. 755 F.2d 99, 103 (7th Cir. 1985).
239. 447 U.S. 54 (1980). See also Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 525 (7th Cir. 1982);
Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 765-66 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956 (1983).
240. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
241. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
242. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
243. 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
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VII and the liability of employers is governed by agency principles); at
pp. 459-60, University of Tennessee v. Elliott,24 4 (unreviewed decision of
state administrative agency acting in a judicial capacity does not have
preclusive effect on Title VII claims); and at p. 464, Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati,245 (single act of policymaking official sufficient to give rise to
municipal liability).
244. 106 S. Ct. 3220 (1986).
245. 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986).
